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  1. On sense and reference. GOTTLOB FREGE. [As reprinted in A.W. Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] Equality [1] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?

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  2. 13 de out. de 2023 · The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.

  3. 14 de set. de 1995 · In the years 1891–1892, Frege gave more thought to the philosophy of language that would help ground his philosophy of mathematics. He published three of his most well-known papers, ‘Function and Concept’ (1891), ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892a), and ‘On Concept and Object’ (1892b) in this period.

  4. 5 de jun. de 2012 · Introduction. The German mathematician and philosopher, Gottlob Frege, is widely regarded as the father of analytic philosophy. His work has shaped everything which has been written in the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition.

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  5. In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.

  6. The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corre-sponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite ref-erence, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.

  7. 28 de set. de 2010 · For Frege, we are obliged to distinguish sense from reference to do justice to differences between sentences that cannot sensibly be accommodated by a theory of reference alone – differences, nevertheless, that logic obliges us to recognize.