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  1. On sense and reference. GOTTLOB FREGE. [As reprinted in A.W. Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] Equality [1] gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?

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  2. In the philosophy of language, the distinction between sense and reference was an idea of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in 1892 (in his paper "On Sense and Reference"; German: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung"), reflecting the two ways he believed a singular term may have meaning.

  3. 13 de out. de 2023 · The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.

  4. 14 de set. de 1995 · In the years 1891–1892, Frege gave more thought to the philosophy of language that would help ground his philosophy of mathematics. He published three of his most well-known papers, ‘Function and Concept’ (1891), ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892a), and ‘On Concept and Object’ (1892b) in this period.

  5. Summary. Key text. Gottlob Frege, ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitung für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892), pp. 25–50; translated (for example) as ‘On Sense and Meaning’ in G. Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); this paper appears in many ...

    • Michael Morris
    • 2006
  6. To such knowledge we never attain. The regular connection between a sign, its sense, and its referent is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite referent, while to a given referent (an object) there does not belong only a single sign.

  7. Summary. As influential as Frege's distinction between sense and reference has been in shaping nearly all contemporary work in the philosophy of language - as well as considerable portions of the philosophy of mind - many of its most prominent critics and proponents alike have, it seems to me, failed adequately to understand it.