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FEDERALIST No. 66. From the New York Packet. Tuesday, March 11, 1788. A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions which may still exist in regard to this matter. The FIRST of these objections is, that ...
4 de jan. de 2002 · The Federalist No. 36 1. [New York, January 8, 1788] To the People of the State of New-York. WE have seen that the result of the observations, to which the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is that from the natural operation of the different interests and views of the various classes of the community, whether the representation of ...
Federalist No. 52 Summary: “The House of Representatives”. Having written very generally about the purpose and powers of the federal government under the Constitution, Madison turns to the particulars of the document and its administration, starting with the House of Representatives. Of paramount concern to him are the qualifications of the ...
FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered. FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive ...
4 de jan. de 2002 · The Federalist No. 62 1 ByJames MadisonorAlexander Hamilton. [New York, February 27, 1788] To the People of the State of New-York. HAVING examined the constitution of the house of representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate.
Summary and Analysis Section X: United States Senate: Federalists No. 62–66 (Madison or Hamilton) This section follows the pattern of the previous section, and is concerned with the qualifications and powers of the Senate. In Chapter 62, qualifications for senators were these: they had to be at least 30 years old, and to have been citizens of ...
From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788. MADISON. To the People of the State of New York: IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other.
