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4 de jan. de 2002 · The Federalist No. 29 1. [New York, January 9, 1788] To the People of the State of New-York. THE power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy.
16 de jun. de 2014 · In this essay, published in 1788, James Madison argues against Thomas Jefferson's proposal to call a constitutional convention whenever a government entity overstepped the authority given to it by the Constitution. The author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia,'' quoted in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught of a ...
7 de nov. de 2023 · Federalist No. 49, 200. Jefferson held that nothing is perpetual, not even constitutions; the earth belongs to the living, not the dead. The Constitution needs revision every nineteen or twenty years. Despite Madison’s criticisms of this claim, Jefferson continued to hold this view as late as 1816.
20 de dez. de 2021 · FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection . FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy . FEDERALIST No. 12.
Federalist No. 49 is an essay by James Madison, the forty-ninth of The Federalist Papers. It was first published by The New York Packet on February 2, 1788, under the pseudonym "Publius", the name under which all The Federalist papers were published.
It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government.
James Madison, The Federalist No. 49 (1788) 1 The Federalist No. 49 is one of a series in which Madison examined how the constitutional separation of powers is best preserved over time against the tendency of each branch of government to encroach on the functions and authority of the others.
