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4 de jan. de 2002 · The Federalist No. 51 1 ByJames MadisonorAlexander Hamilton. [New York, February 6, 1788] To the People of the State of New-York. TO what expedient then shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that ...
The Federalist Papers. No. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States. For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, November 14, 1787. HAMILTON. To the People of the State of New York: THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state of disunion, from ...
FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia. From the New York Packet. Wednesday, January 9, 1788. HAMILTON. To the People of the State of New York: THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching ...
24 de mar. de 2023 · In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton shifts from dangers to the states from foreign powers to dangers to the states from each other (should they choose disunion): The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society.
Federalist No. 51 was an essay published by American politician and statesman, James Madison, on February 6, 1788. It was the fifty-first paper in a series of 85 articles that are collectively known as the Federalist Papers. These articles were aimed at modifying public opinion in favor of ratifying the new US Constitution.
The Powers of the Senate. From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, March 5, 1788. JAY. To the People of the State of New York: IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy of blame.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
